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I. Introduction
Although it has appeared in the social and political spotlight more so in the past few decades than it has
at any other point in history, opposition to the use of animals in scientic experiments { especially those
aimed at facilitating the production of new cosmetic products { is nothing new. Since at least the 18th
century, many notable philosophers and activists have spoken out for animal rights and against the use of
non-humans for testing of products whose sole beneciary is the human race. In 1739, David Hume recog-
nized that animals were \endow'd with thought and reason as well as men," and Immanuel Kant opposed
cruelty to animals not for their sake but rather for man's, noting animal abuse's detrimental eect on hu-
mans' relationships with one another.1
Perhaps most famously, Jeremy Bentham supplied many modern animal rights activists with early philo-
sophical support when he stated, \[t]he question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can
they suer?"2 The response to this nal rhetorical question was, in the nineteenth century, the enactment
of incipient animal rights' legislation in Europe3 and additional formal opposition to animal cruelty in the
United States.4 And even if many of the writers who followed Bentham have argued for the discontinuation
of animal experimentation in the eld of medicine as well as that of cosmetics,5 it is the latter { because
1See Jane A. Smith & Kenneth M. Boyd, Lives in the Balance: The Ethics of Using Animals in Biomedical
Research 300 (1991). Kant's statement was: \He who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men." Id.
2Id.
3See Clifford J. Sherry, Animal Rights 73 (1994) (noting that \the British were the rst to attempt to regulate painful
research [on animals] with the passage of the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876.").
4See id. at 47-54. Sherry explains that two important organizations { the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals and the American Humane Association { were founded in this country in the mid-1800s. Sherry goes on to mention
that many more radical organizations, begun in the 1970s and 80s, were aimed specically at combating the use of animals in
research, teaching, and the testing of products. Id. at 53-54.
5See, e.g., Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Testing, in In Defense of Animals 13 (Peter Singer ed., 1985) (arguing that
true animal rights activists must not only support the total abolition of the use of animals in all of science, but also seek to
eliminate commercial animal agriculture and sport hunting). But see Robert Wright, Are Animals People Too?, The New
1of its relative frivolity, or at the very least its lack of absolute necessity { that has been most successfully
criticized and indeed serves today's animal rights campaigners with their most promising avenue towards
gaining relief for their non-human brethren.
A common stumbling block, however, for activists attempting to follow this path has been the dismissal by
more moderate policy-makers of proposals that, often partly because of the mere manner in which they are
presented, strike them as morally unconscionable. Without any doubt, a great deal of emotion inheres in
both sides of the argument over the use of animals in scientic experimentation, and the debate's viewpoints
have consequently polarized. This is unfortunate. For when advocates in any setting are led to make un-
reasonable statements and arguments6 out of anger rather than reason, the chance of success by either side
becomes remote. This essay's goal is rst to survey some of what has recently been asserted { by philosophers
as well as legal codes { about animal testing and then, more importantly, to analyze the diculties that
have arisen in this discourse with an eye toward developing a means of resolving them.
In order to determine the gamut of issues involved in the debate over animal experimentation, it is helpful
rst to examine in brief the reasons that the subject is one so charged with emotion. Many of the essays on
both sides of the issue begin with stories meant to pull at heart-strings. \We wept and watched, my wife and
I, as a little girl fought for her life," begins one account explaining the vitality of animal testing to life-saving
advances in medical science.7 Other emotionally-eective accounts begin with stories of dogs dying in their
Republic, Mar. 12, 1990, at 23 (claiming that animal rights advocates can coherently support and rely upon socially valuable
uses of animal testing).
6Carl Cohen, for example, in an article criticized even by those who share his pro-testing views, argues that the use of animal
testing should be increased rather than decreased, providing a questionable argument in support of this proposition. See Carl
Cohen, The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research, 315 New Eng. J. Med. 865, 867 (1986). See also Edwin
Converse Hettinger, The Responsible Use of Animals in Biomedical Research, Between the Species, Summer 1989, at 129
(1989) (attacking Cohen's extreme position). For an equally inappropriate, anger-invoking essay advocating the other side of
the argument, see Peter Singer, To Do or Not to Do?, Hastings Center Report, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 42-43 (fabricating an
emotional story about experimentation on mentally retarded people but only disclosing its falsity midway through the essay).
See also Rod Preece & Lorna Chamberlain, Animal Welfare & Human Values 45 (noting the counterproductive eect
of each polarized viewpoint's distortion of facts regarding animal use in science).
7Robert B. White, Beastly Questions, Hastings Center Report, Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 39.
2futile attempts to save children,8 atrocities involving chimpanzees in scientic laboratories,9 and the like.
Aside, of course, from providing a colorful opening to a persuasive essay, such strategies attempt to win the
reader over to the author's side from the get-go { before, that is, they introduce any substantive arguments.
And while the immediate eect might be, rhetorically, a strong one, this paper's reasoning attempts to reveal
its double edge. That is to say, the truth is that there are equally disturbing stories to be told by those
who support animal testing and those who oppose it. Neither side suggests { at least when it is speaking
credibly10 { that adoption of its position would result in a complete end to suering.
William Timberlake uses the rst paragraph of one of his essays to espouse an observation somewhat more
signicant than a sympathy-evoking story. \Animal suering," he submits in response to the impassioned
writings of the outspoken animal advocate Peter Singer, \has become so emotionally charged a term that
attempts to analyze it critically have been rejected in favor of immediate action to stop it."11 The civil
disobedience Timberlake alludes to and Singer himself describes,12 however, can hardly be viewed as a rea-
sonable road toward resolution of any problem. If the majority of the animal rights movement embraces, as
one author notes some activists have, a \general disillusionment, or even hostility towards science itself"13
rather than towards the more narrow target of unnecessary iniction of pain upon animals, it will have let
its emotions get the better of it { and will likely, given its relatively small size, suer the consequence of
simply being silenced by the powers of the status quo.
All of this said, perhaps emotions will always { and perhaps, to a carefully limited degree, should { play a
role in the debate this paper addresses. Tom Regan provides the following support for such a proposition:
8See Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum, Animal Experimentation: The Moral Issues 7 (1991).
9See Stephen Zak, Ethics and Animals, The Atlantic, Mar. 1989, at 69 (1989).
10Compare supra note 1 (noting Descartes' now discredited \view that animals lacked not only reason, but also consciousness
and any capacity to suer pain.").
11William Timberlake, The Attribution of Suering, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Mar. 1980, at 36.
12See Singer, supra note 6, at 44-45 (describing how one activist severely damaged a laboratory that had been performing
tests on monkeys).
13Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals 144 (1990).
3It is our hearts, not our heads, that call for an end to it all, that demand of us
that we overcome, for [animals'] sake, the habits and forces behind their systematic
oppression. All great movements, it is written, go through three stages: ridicule,
discussion, adoption. It is the realization of this third stage, adoption, that requires
both our passion and our discipline, our hearts and our heads.14
Perhaps the general principle here, rather than the one-sided nature of its argument for animal rights, is the
important thing. Read in a neutral way, it instructs those interested in resolving the animal-experimentation
dilemma to keep at least in the back of their minds not only the compelling emotional reasons for holding the
views they do but also the equally-valid emotional bases for the ideas of those who oppose them. Perhaps
most importantly, no one involved in this debate should forget the bridge-burning, door-closing eect that
over-reliance on emotions can cause.
II. The Arguments For and Against Animal Experimentation
If emotion has established the tone of the ongoing { and sometimes violent { debate over the use of animals
in scientic experimentation, what represents its substance? Since people obviously began using animals in
laboratories before they began to articulate arguments against doing so, perhaps the most logical place to
begin in answering this question is by noting the most fundamental argument in support of animal testing.
There is little question that animal experimentation has led to signicant advances in medicine, and that these
advances have in turn led more or less directly to the protection of countless human lives. Treatments such as
4the enzyme streptokinase (which dissolves clotted blood in the coronary arteries of heart attack patients), the
vaccination against poliomyelitis that has turned polio into a near-forgotten American memory, the surgical
replacement of arthritis-crippled joints,15 and the life-saving treatment for cystic brosis16 are just a very
few of the great number of drugs and medical processes that have been made available for human use only
after being tested and perfected on dogs, cats, monkeys, and other animals.17 The empirical human value,
then, of animal testing, seems clear enough from examples such as these.
But this statement may not be entirely true. As much as it can be of use to the development of life-saving
technology, required animal testing can also, potentially, be a hindrance. One author, for instance, notes
that penicillin, one of the most important medications of the modern world, was used almost immediately
on humans because of limited supply of the drug on the one hand and its immediate need on the other. \It
is interesting to note," the authors state, \that much testing [of penicillin] was done on cell cultures in vitro
...[.] One may wonder if the present regulatory demands would crumble if a situation were to recur in which
such urgency of therapeutic need was unmistakable."18 The implication here { that current regulations place
undue burdens on the availability of drugs to the public { will be more fully addressed in section three of
this paper. The fundamental point { that eective testing does not necessarily require the use of live animals
{ has been an argument mounted with some force for those who favor careful testing but oppose the use of
living animals.19
Perhaps the strongest criticism, however, of animal experimentation is that the results of many animal
tests may be invalid as applied to humans. Walsh and Pyrich assert this claim by noting that \[s]ome
15See supra note 7.
16See supra note 8, at 9.
17Id.
18D.R. Laurence, A.E.M. McLean, & M. Weatherall, Conclusions, in Safety Testing of New Drugs 166 (Laurence,
McLean, and Weatherall eds., 1984).
19See, e.g., The Commission of the European Communities's Annual Report: Development, Validation and Legal Acceptance
of Alternative Methods to Animal Experiments, COM/94/0606/FIN 4 (1994). Cf. Smith and Boyd, supra note 1, at 40-41,
who note that \[n]ot every addition to scientic knowledge ...is suciently signicant to justify the use (let alone every use)
of animals" and therefore have developed a three-part test for determining when use of living animals in scientic testing is
justied.
5commentators have argued that the FDA relies too heavily on animal studies, which are, in fact, of fairly
limited use ...in proving safety and eectiveness in humans."20 To return to the subject of penicillin with
the more formidable weight of this argument, consider the following statement:
[A] number of drugs used successfully to treat human beings cause tumors or
leukemias in animals. In fact, Sir Alexander Fleming claimed that the penicillin
project was successful because he never tested the drug in animals. Had he known
of penicillin's animal toxicity, Fleming said that he never would have tried it on
human subjects.21
While Laurence et al. note the number of lives saved because of penicillin's speedy approval for human use
compared to the imagined result of its delay through lengthy animal testing,22 Dillman imagines a scenario
even more detrimental to human life, viz., the non-acceptance of a pivotal drug on the basis of none other
than animal testing itself.
Another commentator on this topic is Mark A. Kassel, who submits in an essay arguing for reform of the
procedures necessary before new drugs may be put on the market: \Studies... show that at least twenty
percent of the positive predictions for toxicity and side eects in animals proved to be false in human
beings.23 As all of the above-referenced scholars do, noting the at least potential invalidity { and therefore
irrelevance, or indeed even dangerously misleading nature { of animal experimentation only opens the door
for compelling criticism. For, as the nal section of this essay will argue, even if the pro-testing contingent
is not moved by emotional, rights-based, or traditional utilitarian arguments against animal use in scientic
experiments, it should at the very least agree that it is undesirable to waste money and eort on procedures
whose results are invalid.
20Charles J. Walsh and Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives
on Private Certication and Tort Reform, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 883, 936 (1996).
22See supra note 18.
23Mark A. Kassel, Note, Getting There First with the Best: The Need to Shorten the Prescription Drug Approval Process,
27 Val. U. L. Rev. 95, 10506 (1992).
6Another noteworthy observation is that this section of the essay has, heretofore, considered only arguments
pertaining to the use of animal experimentation aimed at producing new and more eective, life-saving
medicines rather than products voluntarily used to improve physical appearance. It is no coincidence that
most of the support for animal testing applies to the medical setting rather than to that of cosmetics,24 and
perhaps also no surprise that animal rights advocates most often focus their attack on the latter. The main
reason for this phenomenon, as mentioned above, is readily-apparent: while medicines save lives, cosmetics
do not. This is not to say, of course, that cosmetics are the only frivolous products (relative, that is, to
life-saving medicines) tested on animals.25
Discounting such extreme positions as Cohen's, which do more merely to anger those opposed to animal
testing than they do to convince them of the problems with their position, there is a more viable argument
in favor of the use of animals in the testing of cosmetics and other non-essential products. This argument, in
a nutshell, is protection of human health26 { and, as such, is actually the very same one that applies to the
medical eld. The only dierence, in fact, is that people in need of new medicines usually have no choice in
24But see Cohen, supra note 6, at 103-104 (arguing that, since animals have no rights whatsoever and lack the capacity for
moral judgment, even slight benets to man justify any amount of animal suering).
25If it considered them in a more in-depth manner, this essay would view countless other products { such as laundry detergents,
pesticides, and food color additives { as open to the exact same type of attack, addressed in this paragraph, that has been
focused against cosmetic products. Rather than discuss each of them individually, however, this paper implicitly groups all
such \frivolous" products together; the arguments against animal testing for cosmetics parallel those against other similar,
non-essential products. One nal point in this regard is that while the strength of these arguments lessens as against testing of
non-prescription (and, therefore, also non-life-saving) drugs since such products undoubtedly assist humans in meaningful ways,
this essay would still assert them but { most importantly { would allow them to be trumped by the more forceful weight of the
economic argument asserted in section four. As the observation about penicillin, supra note 21, implies, this nal argument
ultimately applies to testing procedures involving cosmetics as well as drugs (whether they must be obtained by prescription
or not) and thus renders their life-saving or mere pain-relieving, &c. property irrelevant.
26See The Commission of the European Communities' Annual Report, supra note 19, at 2, which sums up the primary
purpose of the European Community's cosmetic safety statute as follows: \A cosmetic product put on the market within the
Community must not cause damage to human health when applied under normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions of use,
taking account, in particular, of the product's presentation, its labeling, any instructions for its use and disposal as well as any
other indication or information provided by the manufacturer or his authorized agent or by any other person responsible for
placing the product on the Community market" (emphasis added).
7the matter, whereas users of cosmetics make a conscious decision to apply or consume products that could
bring them harm.
Criticism of testing for frivolous ends, not surprisingly, abounds.27 Standing alone, such criticism probably
does not do the persuasive work needed in order to convince most of those who favor animal testing that
their position is mistaken. When, however, the argument is coupled with credible and non-emotional attacks
on the validity of animal tests, it gains (as suggested above) strength. Baird and Rosenbaum give an example
of how the two elements can be woven together by rst noting the pain caused by the \Lethal Dose-50"
(LD-50) test and then giving the following description of that test:
T[he] LD-50 test requires feeding [test animals] a sucient quantity of the product
in question to nd the dose that kills 50 percent of [them] .... \Because most
cosmetic products are not especially poisonous, it necessarily follows that if a rat
or a dog has to be killed this way, then very great quantities of the cosmetic must
be forced into their stomachs, blocking or breaking internal organs, or killing the
animal by some other physical action, rather than by any specic chemical eect."28
While this statement may at rst seem to constitute an eective argument based on the observation that the
LD-50 test is misplaced in an area of products in which not only very small quantities of any given substance
are intended for use at one time but also that none of the substances are intended to be taken internally,
the interest in human health could easily be seen to trump nonetheless. For what, researchers are required
to imagine,29 would happen if, say, a toddler came across a bottle of ngernail polish remover and drank its
entire contents?
If reasonable animal rights supporters would concede that it is an important objective of science and reg-
ulatory schemes to prevent products that can kill people (in however improbable a manner) from reaching
27See, e.g., Wright, supra note 5 (distinguished between frivolous and non-frivolous uses of animal resources); Dillman, supra
note 21, at 946 (discounting as frivolous animal tests aimed at predicting future potential risks for patients who do not have
more than a few months to live); Jack M. Kress, Xenotransplatation: Ethics and Economics, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 353, 366
(1998) (asserting that \opposing the abuse of animals for the sake of selling a new cosmetic" is a \relatively easy position." ).
29See The Commission of the European Communities' Annual Report, supra note 19, at 2.
8consumers, animal testing of cosmetics should arguably be thought every bit as important as animal testing
of drugs. But if a combination of the frivolity and invalidity arguments is ultimately somewhat disappoint-
ing in this instance, what, exactly, is wrong with it? As this essay sees it, the problem with Baird and
Rosenbaum's statement is once again over-reliance on emotion, and the strength of arguments such as those
of Dillman, Green, Peskoe, and others30 is their simplicity { their unemotional, wholly empirical nature.
The preceding paragraph is by no means an argument that the validity argument should fail. Instead, it is
attempt to delineate that defense's boundaries { an important endeavor in this area, where strong arguments
may ultimately fall short of their mark when they are made specious through the use even of implied, let
alone vividly explicit, emotional pleas.
Focused on discussion of realizing medical advances, protecting consumers, and proving the validity of tests
on animals, this section's discourse has up until now taken place on a mostly practical, rather than theoreti-
cal, plane. Yet many of the arguments concerning animal rights in the area of scientic experimentation are
penned not by legal scholars or scientists but rather by philosophers. Although the nal section of this essay
will view them as mostly irrelevant to the actual resolution of the problem of animal testing in this country
and others, the following few pages provide a brief sketch of some of these thinkers' positions.
Perhaps the most logical theoretical question to begin with is what people mean when they use the word
\animal." While Singer sees humans as falling within this denition, referring to man as the \human ani-
mal,"31 most writers embrace the more colloquial { and, arguably, speciesist { denition that views mankind
as standing outside of the \animal" group and within a category that excludes, indeed, all else. The question
such theorists and this paper wish to address is where the line should be drawn below which living things
should be accorded no right to avoid being subjected to scientic tests. If most would argue that man is
30See supra note 21.
31See Peter Singer, The Signicance of Animal Suering, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Mar. 1980, at 9. See generally
Philip Dziuk, The Need for SYMbiosis Between Animals including Humans: SYMBAH, in Animal Research, Animal Rights,
Animal Legislation 29 (Patrick W. Concannon ed., 1990).
9not below that line, and some would argue that dogs are not either, would, say, spiders { or amoebas { be?
Addressing this question, Steven Zak asks:
Must we treat dragonies the same as dolphins? Surely not. Distinctions must
be made, though to judge denitively which animals must be ruled out as holders
of rights may be impossible even in principle. In legal or moral discourse we are
virtually never able to draw clear lines. This does not mean that drawing a line
anywhere, arbitrarily, is as good as drawing one anywhere else.32
Zak's answer does not give much in the way of a practical answer. Richard Ryder, however, oers at least
some assistance in this regard { and indeed represents the most commonly-held position among animal rights
supporters. He states, simply: \I believe our respect for others should include all sentients."33 The obvious
question that follows such a statement is how anyone could ever determine which animals are capable of
feeling what degree of sensation. This question is, of course, even less determinable34 than the one this
paragraph opens with, redoubling the diculties involved in its own determination.
Whatever it or other people understand \animals" (or \beasts," as it calls them) to include, the Bible has
been a starting point for many arguments involving animal rights: \Modern philosophical debate about the
use of animals in biomedical research," Smith and Boyd explain, \has roots in ancient Hebrew and Classical
culture. In the Genesis myths, ...man is given dominion over the animals, and the opportunity to name each
species."35 This biblical excerpt is one that some advocates of animal testing in the distant past relied upon
to justify almost all action against animals in the name of furthering human welfare.36 Animals were put on
33Richard Ryder, Speciesism, in Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research 14 (1983). See also Peter Singer,
Animal Liberation 3 (1975).
34But see Hettinger, supra note 6, at 127 (implying that it is indeed possible to determine degrees of sentience, and noting in
fact that less-developed organisms will sometimes feel more, rather than less, pain as compared to more-developed organisms).
35See supra note 1, at 298.
36After noting that Descartes \supported this view by pronouncing animals to be machines without minds or souls," Julian
McAllister Groves goes on to submit that such a view, based on biblical justication, was prevalent in seventeenth-century
England: \[P]eople began to believe that animals benet from and even enjoy sacricing themselves for humans." Julian
McAllister Groves, Hearts and Minds: The Controversy over Laboratory Animals 32 (1997). See also Helena
Silverstein, Unleashing Rights: Law, Meaning, and the Animal Rights Movement 39 (1996) (adding St. Augustine and
St. Thomas Aquinas to the list of those who relied upon biblical arguments favoring the unfettered utilization of animals). But
see Kress, supra note 27, at 367 (claiming that \[b]oth JudeoChristian teaching and Greek philosophy agreed that cruelty to
10this earth, the argument goes, for man to make use of in any way he saw t. While there are undoubtedly
some that might still support this view, most credible advocates of animal testing adhere at least partially
to Kant's idea that animal cruelty is injurious to man's dignity37 { in other words, that conscience dictates
responsible treatment of those over which the human race is able to exercise so great a degree of control.38
It is this type of reasonable, mainstream defense that the Associated Medical Schools of New York (AMA)
asserts39 as well as, assumably, other organizations whose daily bread and butter is experimentation on
animals.
The view directly opposing the AMA's (which might be summed up as a necessity argument tacked onto the
original Kantian position) appears a good deal less reasonable to most people. This less-popular { if, when
divorced from emotion, perfectly rational { view is that every animal has just as much right to survival as
does every human being: \Animal liberationists do not separate out the human animal. A rat is a pig is a
dog is a boy."40 This position is a reaction to a concept known in the animal rights debate as \speciesism";
the previous paragraph describes a somewhat watered-down version of it. In its pure form, speciesism is
\the view that species membership is, in itself, a reason for giving more weight to the interests of one being
than to those of another."41 Although Singer mentions that \this position, properly understood, is virtually
never defended,"42 J.A. Gray is one writer who advocates it. In an essay that is, as much as anything else,
animals was wicked in itself, and furthermore was demeaning to humans.").
37See supra note 1.
38Expressing, uncharacteristically, a fairly well-accepted modern view, Peter Singer eschews consideration of religious argu-
ments shortly after he acknowledges them in one of his essays: \I am putting aside ...theological questions, partly because
there is no rational foundation for the premises on which they are based, and also because if we are considering public policy
in a pluralistic society, we should not take a particular religious outlook as the basis for our laws." Singer, supra note 31.
39In a pro-testing position statement for this organization, David H. Schwarz explains: \AMS fully acknowledges that, along
with the responsibility to fulll our research role is the need for stewardship on behalf of those animals which are so vital to
this work. All institutions conducting research must enforce appropriate standards for the care and use of laboratory animals.
Research centers are currently subject to extensive laws, policies, guidelines and accreditation standards dealing with the use
of animals in research .... Our disagreement is not with advocates of appropriate and respectful use of animals in a manner
consistent with established guidelines for animal welfare, but with extremists who insist that no circumstances exist under
which we can morally dierentiate between the worth of the life of a human being and that of an animal." Letter to the Editor,
244 Science 1128 (1989).
40Katie McCabe, Who Will Live, Who Will Die?, Washingtonian, Aug. 1986, at 114 (quoting Ingrid Newkirk).
41See Singer, supra note 31, at 10.
42Id.
11a rebuttal to Singer's The Signicance of Animal Suering, Gray rst draws a distinction \between ethical
principals and moral choices" to conclude that while, in the abstract, it might be equally reprehensible to
inict unnecessary pain on a spider as it would be to inict it on a human being, a type of biological { that
is, innate or instinctual { morality guides our actions.43
Gray then applies his example of this automatic tendency of a mother's protection of own child to the context
of animal rights by rst noting that the use or non-use of animals in scientic experiments is a decision that
aects who (i.e., either test animals or sick people) will suer and then arguing that the medical world
should follow the mother's emotion-based logic to favor protection of its own kind over another's. Such is
the logic that allows Gray and other defenders of speciesism to conclude it is \morally right to carry out
...experiments [on animals]."44 It is perhaps not surprising that this position is infrequently defended.
As this paper sees it, the strongest argument for animal testing comes from the likes of Mary Anne Warren,
who bases her reasoning upon the consideration that animals, unlike humans, lack the ability to reason
and make thoughtful decisions.45 Rationality is morally relevant, Warren argues, not because it makes
humans somehow better than members of other species but rather because it \provides greater possibilities
for cooperation and for the nonviolent resolution of problems."46 Her argument is better reasoned { not to
mention more reasonable { than Gray's: \The recognition of the moral equality of other persons is the price
43See J.A. Gray, In Defense of Speciesism, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Mar. 1980, at 22-23. The hypothetical Gray
uses to illustrate his point is that of a mother who is faced with the dilemma \of saving one of two small children from a re,
knowing that the other will die." Only one of the children is her own. While the original choice (the mother saves her own child)
is as morally acceptable as any to Gray, when the author changes the conditions, viz., \[t]he mother's own child is crippled,
mentally handicapped, or shows dangerous psychotic tendencies, whereas the other is healthy and normal," he reasons that \a
point would come at which the imbalance between the two children ...would outweigh the initial bias in favor of the mother's
own child." Gray qualies this somewhat nebulous remark with the assertion that \few would nd it morally unacceptable if
the required degree of imbalance turned out to be rather large, as I imagine it would in most real cases." Id. at 22.
44Id. at 23. See also Cohen, supra note 6, at 68, who declares that he is a speciesist and, therefore, would likely support
Gray's conclusions whole-heartedly.
45See Warren, supra note 32, at 170.
46Id.
12we must each pay for their recognition or our moral equality."47
The crucial argument here is that humans stand above animals in one important respect: namely, in their
ability to take actions that cause harm in the short run (e.g., performing painful tests on animals) but
produce great benets in the long run (e.g., saving human lives). We should not accord animals the same
rights as humans because we cannot work with them to better the world for us all. Her position is credible
partly because it rejects the unthinking speciesist position, which animals instinctually apply, for the more
thoughtful and caring approach of a human mind: \Because we cannot reason with most non-human ani-
mals,48 we cannot always solve the problems which they may cause without harming them { although we
are always obligated to try."49 To argue strict speciesism, in other words, is to strip human existence of the
one thing that might in fact justify its superiority over that of animals.
If Warren expresses a strong argument for animal testing, how do those who oppose her respond? Steven Zak
notes that \early animal-protection advocates and groups ...seldom talked about rights. They condemned
cruelty { that is, acts that produce or reveal bad character."50 These types of arguments, such as the one that
led \early nineteenth-century England campaigners against the popular sport of bull-baiting [to argue] that
it `fostered every bad and barbarous principle of our nature,"51 fall rather quickly into two traps identied
above: Not only would the protest be subject to an analog of Warren's implied criticism of Gray's instinct-
47Id. Warren, incidentally, notes parenthetically the detrimental eect of weak arguments on the cause of those who favor
animal experimentation: \Bad reasoning reduces our eective intelligence rather than increasing it." Id.
48To illustrate this proposition, Warren quotes from Bonnie Steinbock, Speciesism and the Idea of Equality, 53 Philosophy
253 (1978) (stating that \[i]f rats invade our houses ...we cannot reason with them, hoping to persuade them of the injustice
they do us. We can only attempt to get rid of them.").
49Warren, supra note 32, at 171.
50See Zak, supra note 9 at 70.
51Id. For an earlier version of such opposition, see Silverstein, supra note 36, at 29 (noting Pope Pius V's 1567 decree
condemning bullghting).
13based reasoning, but it could also easily be placed into the same category of theological thinking that Singer
eectively discredits.52 Furthermore, this argument, if asserted today in the animal experimentation debate,
would almost certainly be conceded to those who voice it since no one persuasively argues for intentional
cruelty to animals for nothing more signicant than human entertainment.53
If this type of argument is misplaced in the modern context, what is a more eective one? Zak claims
that \[m]odern activists have abandoned the idea that cruelty is demeaning to human character (`virtue
thought') in favor of the idea that the lives of animals have intrinsic value (`rights thought')."54 One of
the most prominent rights theorists in the animal experimentation eld is Tom Regan. To Regan, the
\fundamental wrong" with any activity that harms animals is not the pain or suering it might cause but
rather the mindset of its human perpetrator that it is permissible to view animals as resources for mankind.55
This statement is clearly aimed at the Biblical justication for the use of test animals this section mentioned
at the beginning of its survey of philosophical viewpoints. Regan goes on to consider and reject the \indirect
duty" view that no animal itself has any rights and that any wrong done against it, if considered a violation
at all, is a violation of its owner's right.56
Although he supports this right-based position (\we ...must at least recognize that we have some duties
directly to animals, just as we have some duties directly to each other"), it is a utilitarian theory that Regan
at least seems to want to embrace.57 Utilitarianism, as Regan sees it, adheres to two moral principals:
52See supra note 31.
53See, e.g., supra note 32.
54See Zak, supra note 6, at 70. See also Warren, supra note 32, at 173 (claiming that current theorists in many areas, only
one of them being animal testing, have chosen to rely on rights arguments).
55See Regan, supra note 5, at 13.
56Id. at 14-16. Regan's means of refuting the \indirect duty" argument is by noting that animals feel pain and thus can be
directly and personally harmed, and by asserting that protecting only those members of the hegemony who are permitted to
have a say in how they are treated would result in unpunishable crimes not only against animals but indeed against any human
being who is a member of a minority group that has eectively been silenced through social, economic, or political means.
57Id. at 18. See also Zak, supra note 6, at 71, who likewise seeks to unify the arguments: \Even true utilitarianism in
incomplete without taking account of rights."
14rst, that everyone's interests should be accorded equal weight, and second, that the best act is that which
brings about \the best balance between satisfaction and frustration for everyone aected by the outcome."58
Regan admits that the dictate of utilitarianism { \to add up (somehow!) the separate satisfactions and
frustrations of everyone likely to be aected by our choice" and then to choose the option that generates
more total satisfaction than frustration { is a tall order and indeed one that is often performed in no single
clearest way.59 Regan tries briey to rescue his admittedly indeterminate utilitarian theory, but soon gives
up, reverting to his rights-based position { which in his view requires the protection of all human and animal
beings, regardless of how \useful" they may be to the aggregate social welfare.60 His nal position seems
to be that every entity has equal \inherent value," which should be respected in an even-handed way across
the board.61 At the end of the day, Regan seems to be claiming that no one person or animal should ever
be harmed for the benet of another.62 Regan's theory is, then, just that.63 Little practical advice can be
gleaned from it, as his treatment of utilitarianism proves.
Finally, the topic of animal use for food by both humans and other animals has made its way into the philo-
sophical debate. Human consumption of animals, to begin with, has been criticized for at least two hundred
years. Peter Singer explains that \William Paley, a progressive moral theologian of the late eighteenth cen-
tury .... wrote that the practice of killing animals to eat them caused them pain and death for our pleasure
and convenience; moreover, eating meat was unnecessary, since we could live on fruits and vegetables, as the
Hindus do."64 Currently, most animal rights advocates recognize that the worldwide meat industry causes
not only great pain and suering but also large-scale environmental destruction. Consequently, many such
58Regan, supra note 5, at 18.
59Id. at 19. Regan illustrates utilitarianism's potentially drastic results with a hypothetical in which he has his cantankerous
but healthy \Aunt Bea" killed so that he can use the resulting inheritance money to make a donation to a local childrens'
hospital. Id.
60Id. at 21.
61Id. at 24.
62Id.
63Regan, id. at 16, admits to being overly cerebral, and is { to his position's detriment.
64See Singer, supra note 31, at 9.
15advocates do not themselves consume animal products. But what about those that do? Despite Cohen's
assertion that \[o]ne cannot coherently object to the killing of animals in biomedical investigations while
continuing to eat them,"65 this paper submits that such a statement is simply irrational. For while an animal
rights advocate who eats animal products might be rightly called a hypocrite, his personal habits should
not aect the coherence { and certainly not the validity { of his arguments. Would anyone, to illustrate,
attempt to refute the arguments of a lawyer representing a consumer group against a tobacco manufacturer
on the grounds that she is a smoker? Incoherence between act and assertion { is and ought { is no grounds,
at least in this instance, for the dismissal of a potentially valid position.
The second, related topic { animal consumption of other animals { allows those who disfavor animal rights
to mount another, somewhat more persuasive, argument. Timberlake sums it up by asking his readers to
[c]onsider the incompatibility of the following beliefs [esposed by Peter Singer and
other animal rights supporters]: (1) All animals (including humans) are equal in
moral status; (2) all animals except humans can promote the survival of their own
kind at the expense of the suering and restricted access to resources of other
species.66
The case for inconsistency here is much stronger than the one asserted by Cohen in the preceding paragraph.
It is indeed a troubled argument, asserting equality among humans and animals and then immediately
attempting to hold humans to a higher standard. The dierence, this essay submits, is that no animal
causes the degree of destruction that humans do. To hunt for food necessary for survival is one thing; to
clear-cut forests for real estate developments or cattle pastures so that people may have spacious back-yards
and plenty of steaks in their grocery store freezers is somewhat of another. Most animals take what they
need, and no more. Humans often take all that they can get, regardless of what eect doing so might have
on animals and the environment. The important statement, then, is the one Warren asserts: rationality, the
65Cohen, supra note 6, at 68 (stating further that \[s]crupulous vegetarianism, in matters of food, clothing, shelter, commerce,
and recreation, and in all other spheres, is the only fully coherent position the critic may adopt." Id.
16ability to reason and make thoughtful decisions, distinguishes us from animals. 67 As humans, we possess a
great power that animals lack. We could be viewed as owing it to ourselves and the world to make choices
that reect that dierence.
The preceding paragraphs have attempted to present (albeit it in an admittedly cursory fashion) some of the
most prominent philosophical arguments surrounding the use of animals in scientic experiments. Although
most of these arguments are applied to medical tests rather than to those performed in the eld of cosmetics,
it is important to keep in mind that it is the latter, arguably less justiable eld, rather than the former on
which this essay focuses directly. The following section will consider what types of laws have been instituted
in this country and others regarding animal experimentation in the cosmetic industry itself. The nal section
will return to, and modify, some of the arguments discussed in the present section in a way that hopes to
synthesize the essay's four parts and at least begin to formulate a way of solving this heated and long-lived
debate.
67See Warren, supra note 32, at 170.
17III. Current Laws Addressing Animal Experimentation
One document this essay has already mentioned in footnotes more than once { the Commission of the
European Communities's Annual Report from 1994 concerning animal testing (the \Report," hereinafter)68
{ and the proposed legislation it engendered will serve as this section's initial focus. The Report is especially
signicant to this paper not only because it provides a good overview of both European and other countries'
approaches to the debate over animal experimentation in the specic area of cosmetics69 but also because
it evidences the success one group of animal rights activists almost realized in establishing protection for
laboratory animals.
The Report begins, as noted above, by delineating the foremost goals involved with regulation of the Euro-
pean Community cosmetic market, including the role it plays in that endeavor. The balance to be struck, the
Report declares, is between \assur[ing] a better level of quality and safety of products and their ingredients
and hence a better level of consumer health protection" on the one hand and \avoid[ing,] ...wherever possi-
ble, ...the suering and death of animals"70 on the other. While the Report concedes that the former goal
should remain the rst and foremost concern, the latter is the very reason for the Report's own existence.
The Report, then, is aimed at assessing means of \oer[ing] the consumer a degree of protection equivalent
68See Report, supra note 19.
69Id. The Report notes that \cosmetic products covers a very wide range of products, including: classical make-up products[,]
perfumes[,] products for use on the hair[,] hygiene and toilet products (including soap, toothpaste[,] pre-shave and after-shave
products)[,] `natural' cosmetic products[,] and various products which protect the skin or mucous membrane and keep them
in good condition, such as sun creams, certain anti-dandru shampoos, wart removers, moisteners, deodorants, cariostatic
toothpastes, etc." Id. at 10.
70Id. at 2. Two pages later, the Report identies the \three-point plan" rst proposed by W.M.S. Russel and R.L. Birch
in their 1959 book The Principals of Humane Experimental Technique, namely, the now well-known \three r's": \(1)
reducing the number of animals used[;] (2) rening existing protocols, so as to reduce animal suering[; and] (3) replacing tests
on animals." Id. at 4, 11.
18to that obtained by animal experiments" without experimenting on sentient animals. Its practical objective
was to oer proof to the European Parliament that animal testing of cosmetic products could be prohibited
without untoward eect on consumers.71
The rst alternative to animal testing the Report considers is testing by way of in vitro methods, which
\include sample biological systems in the form of bacteria, cultures of cells or animal or human tissues,
organotypical cultures or systems using articial media (reconstructed skin) ...or physical and chemical
tests (alkaline-acid reserve, etc.)."72 While the Report notes that in vitro toxicity tests are often \incom-
plete by comparison with the eects observed in vivo,"73 and that to gain legal acceptance any such test
would need to be subjected to years of study to ensure { by \consensus within the scientic community of
the 25 Member States"74 { its validity, the Report nonetheless suggests that in vitro methods may present
viable options for at least some tests. Examples of in vitro tests that have been \validated" by the European
scientic community include photoirritation and phototoxicity,75 and, to a less-denitive degree, an in vitro
eye irritation test that would replace the much-criticized in vivo Draize procedure.76 Aside from these two
tests, the Report claims that one other { percutaneous absorption { is in the \prevalidation" stage77 and
that three more { skin sensitization, acute toxicity, and skin irritation { are in the \development" stage.78
71Id. at 2-3. The Report provides, however, that \[i]f there has been insucient progress in developing satisfactory methods
to replace animal testing, and in particular those cases where alternative methods of testing, despite all reasonable endeavors,
have not been scientically validated as oering an equivalent level of protection for the consumer ...the Commission shall, by
1 January 1997, submit draft measures to postpone the date of implementation of this provision, for a sucient period, and in
any case for no less than two years.... Before submitting such measures, the Commission will consult the Scientic Committee
on Cosmetology." Id. at 3.
72Id. at 4. As opposed to in vitro methods, standard animals tests are in vivo (i.e., performed on live animals). The Report
later goes on to list and describe commonly-used in vivo test procedures. Id. at 7-9.
73Id. at 4.
74Id. at 6.
75Id. at 15 (noting also that \[c]orrelation with in vivo data in the literature (man/animal) is excellent.").
76Id. at 15-16. The Report qualies the eye irritation test's \validation" status by noting: \Although sampling is not enough
to cover the entire cosmetic universe, ...the study should cast light on certain classes of products." Id. at 16.
77Id. at 15. Despite percutaneous absorption's prevalidation status, the Report seems optimistic about its at least partial
eventual success: \The method ...has been validated through reproducible intra- and interlaboratory results showing a good in
vitro / in vivo correlation for several substances. It can replace in vivo cutaneous penetration tests but tells us nothing about
the metabolism and toxicokinetics." Id.
78Id. at 16. The prognosis for these tests is dim: \In view of the current state of research, and the diculty of validation
exercises, in vitro methods cannot yet replace tests on live animals." Id.
19The conclusion of the Report, then, is not an especially positive one for those who would have liked to see the
use of animals in cosmetic product testing abolished by 1998. Indeed, after having postponed it more than
once, the European Parliament quite recently pushed this abolition date back again, noting that sucient
alternative methods to in vivo tests had still not been realized.79 The 1994 Report lists some reasons why its
eorts failed. First and foremost, it recognizes that \[v]alidation studies are costly and time-consuming."80
Apparently, the support provided by a variety of countries and organizations81 has simply not been sucient,
given the high standards necessary to ensure consumer protection.82 In its concluding pages, the Report
states:
The results obtained in the development and validation of batteries of in vitro
eye irritation tests concern specic chemical families and certain groups of nished
products[. T]here is no conclusive evidence that these results can be extrapolated to
the evaluation of ingredients belonging to dierent structural classes and functional
groups, notably to the ingredients likely to be included in the positive lists, viz.,
preservatives, colouring agents and UV lters (hair dyes).83
But even if in vitro tests have not been accepted by the scientic community as viable alternatives to
testing on live animals, the Report does support with somewhat more optimism methods that \contribute
to reducing the number of test animals and the suerings inicted on them."84 At least a step in the right
direction as far as animal rights goes, this partial remedy applies to the xed dose method,85 the acute toxic
79See Commission Directive of 17 April 1997, 97/18/EC 1 (\postponing the date after which animal tests are prohibited for
ingredients or combinations of ingredients of cosmetic products.").
80Report, supra note 19, at 16. The report provides the following reason for this statement, implying that test methods
must be repeated by many more laboratories than the ones that developed them: \As regards alternative in vitro tests, it is
dicult to draw conclusions on the performance of the individual tests. The performance of the test systems varies with the
substances and the groups of products tested and it is impossible to extrapolate the results of a validation exercise to all types
of substances and products." Id.
81The Report lists the following { though not all nancial { supporters of its project: the Consumer Policy Service, the
Galileo Data Bank, Invittox, the Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments, SCAAT, CFTA, JCLA, and
COLIPA. Id. at 13-14.
82Id. at 22.
84Id. at 17. See also Rodd, supra note 13, at 150 (arguing that \it would be desirable to have a legal requirement that all
experiments should obtain advice from a statistician (and follow it) so that numbers of animals used in experiments are reduced
to an absolute minimum."); Alternatives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and Education, OTA-BA-273 7 (1986)
(stating that \even if animals cannot be replaced in certain experiments, researchers can attempt to reduce the number used
and also to minimize pain and distress.").
85Id. at 17. \The in vivo xed dose method proposed by the British Toxicology Society restricting the number of test
animals and reducing animal suering was accepted by the OECD ...after an international validation study showed that it was
20class method,86 the skin sensitization test,87 and mutagenicity / genotoxicity testing.88
The nal section of the Report, \The Outlook," claims that in vitro alternatives are just around the corner
in the area of tests for eye irritation, percutaneous absorption, basic mutagenicity, and phototoxicity /
photoirritation.89 However, while the Report notes that such tests might soon be countenanced by the
scientic community, it also states that \their legal acceptance cannot be assured until the diculties and
unknowns in the validation and evaluation exercises referred to earlier on have been removed."90 The Report
ends by calling for: (1) more research as to whether \studies currently being developed and validated can be
applied to a greater number of dierent substances," (2) selection of \a group of substances whose in vivo
toxicity data are pertinent to an in vitro / in vivo correlation exercise" (assumably to avoid the need to repeat
in vivo tests whose results are known), and (3) optimization of \databases of tests and implement[ation of]
an adequate and coordinated system for providing information by creating a cosmetic products database."91
Currently, in vivo animal testing continues in Europe, if to a somewhat lesser degree, in the same way it has
for many years.92
scientically valid for the values LD < 25 mg/kg, 25 to 200 mg/kg, 200 to 2000 mg/kg and > 2000 mg/kg. It has been approved
with the preliminary screening test[,] which provides information on the dose to be applied in the main study." Id.
86Id. at 18. This test is apparently somewhat akin to the LD-50 test mentioned in the previous section in that \death is the
main biological consequence." It requires, however, fewer animals. Id. See also Alternatives to Animal Use in Research,
Testing, and Education, supra note 84, at 8 (noting that \[t]ests providing the same information [as the LD-50 test] have
recently been developed using as few as 10 animals, i.e., a 3- to 10-fold reduction."
87Id. \OECD recommends using these tests as a rst stage in evaluating a sensitizing potential. If a positive result is obtained
in one of these tests, it is not necessary to continue with in vivo tests." Id.
88Id. In these types of tests, which relate generally to genetic mutation, the Report claims that \[u]se of in vivo tests can be
limited to certain cases, to verify whether an activity observed in vitro is also expressed in vivo." Id.
89Id. at 23.
90Id.
91Id. at 24.
92Id. at 19: \On the basis of partial communication by the Member States under Articles 13 and 26 of Directive 86/609/EEC
on the number of animals used for experimental purposes or other scientic purposes during 1991, no monkeys, cats or dogs were
used to test cosmetics, and the numbers of rodents and rabbits used to test cosmetics and body hygiene products, compared
with the total number of animals of the same species used in toxicity tests in the eld of human, animal and environmental
protection, are: 248 to 25 994 in the Netherlands[,] 2 028 to 19 468 in Spain[,] 22 880 to 89 620 in France[, and] 3 082 to 171 530
in the United Kingdom." Perhaps even more noticeable, however, than the dierence in numbers of animals used in cosmetic
versus health and environmental protection is the sheer amount of animals used in toto in these countries. See, e.g., Zak, supra
note 6, at 73 (claiming that, in the United States alone, \estimates of the number of animals used each year in laboratories
...range from 17 million to 100 million: 200,000 dogs, 50,000 cats, 60,000 primates, 1.5 million guinea pigs, hamsters, and
rabbits, 200,000 wild animals, thousands of farm animals and birds, and millions of rats and mice."
21Unfortunately for animal rights activists in this country, the American outlook is not even as hopeful as Eu-
rope's. \The Food and Drug Administration," the Report claims, \encourages the development of alternative
methods but ...concludes that it is unlikely that animal tests can be completely dispensed with in the near
future."93 While the rst attempt at legal protection of animals used for scientic experiments came in 1896
with Minnesota Republican Representative James McMillan's proposal of a Congressional bill \to regulate
vivisection in the District of Columbia," the bill did not pass and indeed the following century witnessed a
large { and largely unchecked { increase in animal experimentation.94 Finally, in 1966, some progress for
animals was made. In that year, Democratic Representative Joseph Y. Resnick convinced Congress to pass
the Cats and Dogs Act, whose three objectives were \(1) to protect the owners of dogs and cats from the
theft of such pets; (2) to prevent the sale or use of stolen dogs or cats for the purpose of research or ex-
perimentation; and (3) to establish humane standards for the treatment of dogs, cats, monkeys (non-human
primates), guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits by animal dealers and medical research facilities."95
These rst two objectives { the ones, indeed, most central to the Act { protected animal owners more than
they protected animals themselves. This should not come as much of a surprise, given that the impetus
behind the passage of the 1966 Act was the retention of an owner's lost dog by an arrogant New York dog
dealer over the owner's adamant objection.96 Indeed, for those who take a dim view of animals' intrinsic
rights, a property interest in animals is one { and perhaps the only { way that legal protection can be, albeit
indirectly, extended to them.97 It makes sense, then, given the evolution of thought on the subject, that
93Report, supra note 19, at 15.
94See Sherry, supra note 3, at 73. See also Mary T. Phillips and Jeri A. Sechzer, Animal Research and Ethical
Conflict: An Analysis of the Scientific Literature: 1966-1986 18 (1989) (noting the post World War II increase in
animal use in science).
95Id. at 74.
96Id. at 73-74.
97See Regan, supra note 5, at 14. Regan summarizes this \indirect duty view" with an example: \[B]y kicking your dog your
22it is under this conceptual framework that animal-protection legislation began.98 There remains, of course,
the Act's third objective, which directs the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture \to promulgate regulations to en-
sure the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers and research facilities,
except during actual research of experimentation as determined by the research facility."99 It is the nal
clause of this statement that is most important: While the 1966 Act requires that animals be moved about
in a considerate way, it nullies their rights when they actually reach the laboratory.
Four years later, the Cats and Dogs Act was amended and renamed the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) of 1970.
This 1970 version expanded the range of people responsible for transporting, handling, &c. animals in a
humane manner to those who ran \carnivals, road shows, circuses, and zoos," and, for whatever reason,
also extended the term \animal" to include both living and dead members of the species listed in the 1966
Act.100 Most importantly for purposes of this paper, the 1970 Act required \each research facility [to] show
that professionally acceptable standards governing the care, treatment, and use of animals during actual
research or experimentation are being followed, including the appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic, and
tranquilizing drugs."101 This provision marked the rst legally-documented concern in this country about
the unpleasant eects of in vivo testing on animals. In 1976, the AWA was amended once again to broaden
neighbor damages your property. And since it is wrong to damage another person's property, your neighbor has done something
wrong { to you, of course, not to your dog." Id. See also Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law 34 (1995)
(explaining the historical basis for the animal-as-property theory in part by noting that \[in] many European languages, the
word `cattle' was synonymous with the words `chattle' and `capital' and that \[t]he Spanish word for property, ganaderia, is
virtually identical to the word for cattle, ganado.") This theory has led a great number of writers to compare the current use
of animals to slavery. See, e.g., Ryder, supra note 33, at 2 (noting that slavery in America was, like animal testing today,
considered \necessary for economic survival" and that many white people believed black slaves could not suer or feel pain in
the way that they could); Wright, supra note 5 (submitting that one crucial dierence between slaves and animals ghting for
their rights is that the former could voice an opinion while the latter cannot { and that this makes animal's chance of success
remote); Singer, supra note 31, at 10-12 (claiming that speciesism is closely akin to racism, sexism, and other methods that
advocate allowing the interests of one's own group to take precedent over other, equally valid interests); Hettinger, supra note
6, at 126 (arguing that \attempting to justify dierential treatment on the basis of species membership alone (as Cohen does)
is not just as morally objectionable as doing so on the basis of race or sex, since members of dierent species are more likely to
require dierential treatment than are members of dierent races of sexes (within a species).").
98Zak, supra note 6, at 72 (noting that \[u]nder the Uniform Commercial Code, for instance, animals { along with refrigerators
and can openers { constitute `goods."').
99Sherry, supra note 3, at 74.
100Id. at 75.
101Id. Sherry also notes that the 1970 Act \describes civil and criminal procedures and penalties" for violation of this provision.
Id.
23the scope of animal-handling people and entities covered and to prohibit animal ghting or the raising of
animals for the purposes of ghting. It failed, however, to tighten experimentation restrictions.102
Yet another amendment to the AWA { this one \Subtitle F: Animal Welfare" of the Food Security Act of
1985 { provides that dogs and primates conned in laboratories be given the opportunity to exercise in an
adequate physical environment.103 Additionally, the 1985 Act mandates that \[d]uring actual experimen-
tation, animal care, treatment, and practices should ensure that animal pain and distress are minimized,
including [sic] adequate veterinary care with appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic, tranquilizing drugs,
and euthanasia."104 Furthermore, the 1985 Act moves markedly beyond its predecessors by \direct[ing]
the principal investigator ...to consider alternatives to any procedures that are likely to cause pain or dis-
tress."105 While this was an important step toward animal rights for American legislation, it still falls short
of the European Community's eorts. That is to say, while the 1985 Act requires the principal investigator
to \consider" alternative methods (a potential illusory promise), the Report proves that many European
companies { as well as some U.S. organizations106 that have joined Europe in its eort to end animal testing
in the cosmetic industry { are contributing in more tangible ways to the development of in vitro and other
alternatives.107
One major dierence between eorts to reduce in vivo animal testing in the United States and those in Europe
is the latter's stated commitment to expending substantial sums of money on investigation of the viability of
102Id. at 76.
103Zak, supra note 6, at 31. See also Sherry, supra note 3, at 77; Phillips and Sechzer, supra note 94, at 24. One even more
recent legislative act { the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 { is worth mentioning even though it protects laboratories
rather than the animals inside them. \This law," Sherry explains, \makes it a federal crime for anyone who crosses national
or state borders and/or uses the mails to cause a physical disruption in the functioning of an animal enterprise. The terrorism
provision says that it is illegal to steal, damage, or cause the loss of property, including animals and records, that causes
economic damage exceeding $10,000." Id.
104Id.
105Id.
106See Report, supra note 19, at 13 (claiming that \[s]ince 1981 the CFTA (Cosmetics, Toiletry and Fragrance Association) has
supported the establishment of a Centre for Alternatives to Animal Test (CAAT) at the John[s] Hopkins University (USA).").
107See Report, supra note 19.
24painless tests: \The European industry devoted ECU 25 million during 1993 to meet the challenge presented
by the sixth amendment to the Cosmetics Directive. It played a major role in the research and development
of in vitro methods which made it possible to reduce or avoid the use of animals."108 It is important that,
though spurred by legislation, industry participants { and not merely European governments { are taking
an active role in the development of alternative testing procedures. To note this, however, is of course not
necessarily to say that European industry acts as it does out of some sense of moral obligation. For while
some CEOs both here and abroad might sympathize with the cause of animal rights, it is their primary
obligation (at least in this country) to act in ways that maximize the prots of their corporations. European
industry acted as it did, we must assume, in order to stay in business. Faced with the threat of such pro-
animal legislation, there was little it could do but take a proactive monetary hit to ensure future survival.
This essay's nal section will further explore the implications of such simple economic truths.
The current state of the law in Europe, however, remains that in vivo animal testing { even for cosmetic
products { is still requisite to consumer protection. In America such testing is even more ensconced: the
FDA eectively requires it for all new products,109 and animal protection statutes such as those surveyed
in this section oer only minimal protection for laboratory animals. The current outlook, at least based
upon the animal rights activists' positions described in section two of this essay, is bleak for both animal
108Id. at 12.
109See 21 C.F.R. Sec. 312.23, \Drugs for Human Use," which refers more than once to the FDA's need to review the results
of animal tests before it will even consider approving a new drug for sale to human consumers. See also Richard A. Merrill,
FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientic
Progress?, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 88 (1988) (noting that \[r]egulators ...consider the results of properly conducted experiments
in animals, primarily rodents, to be highly relevant evidence of a substance's capacity to cause cancer in humans."). While there
may be no explicit animal-testing requirement for cosmetics, there is a tacit one. See, e.g, Oce of Technological Assessment,
Alternatives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and Education, supra note 84, 160 (1986): \FDA has no statutory
authority to require testing of cosmetics for safety (other than their color additives) before they are marketed. However, animal
testing is commonly undertaken to substantiate labeling claims and, by regulation, FDA has stated that any cosmetic with an
ingredient that has not been substantiated for safety in its nal product form must bear a prominent label declaration that the
safety of the product has not been determined."
25test subjects and their human advocates. However, the following section will propose a critical rethinking of
the issue and, potentially, a way to brighten the prospects for these long-ignored groups.
IV. Conclusion and Proposal
To summarize by analogy, the conclusions of both the Report and current U.S. legislation state an implicit
claim that is somewhat akin to one from the modern-day automobile industry, viz., that while new tech-
nologies to replace the environmentally-destructive internal combustion engine seem just barely out of reach,
there is still a lot of work that needs to be done { and a great deal of money spent { before such new
technology's development and implementation can be realized. The two scenarios are similar in other ways
as well: today's automobile engine, like traditional in vivo animal testing, has been around since the days
of Ford and Bentham, respectively, is broadly recognized as undesirable, will require time and money to
replace, and is surrounded by an aura of untouchability since so many people { naturally resistant to change
{ have come to rely quite comfortably upon it. Perhaps in both industries, a signicant question may be
just how much the penultimate similarity listed, as compared to the nal one, is checking progress.
But even if readers of this paper conclude that most people are either too complacent or simply do not care
about animal suering enough to question their cosmetic purchases, there remains the question { merely
assumed by many animal rights theorists { of whether we should care about the suering that goes on in
laboratories. Such writers as Regan110 and Singer111 { and even less extreme animal rights advocates such as
110See Regan, supra note 5.
111See Singer, supra note 31.
26Kress112 { do not genuinely consider the idea that they might be entirely wrong, that animals should in fact
be accorded no rights and that humans are justied in performing any and all tests on them no matter how
frivolous or trivial the end product or result may be. Yet intelligent (if extreme) thinkers on the other side
of the debate, like Cohen, maintain this very opinion. Having made such an observation, and acknowledging
that the issue will almost certainly never be resolved on a philosophical level (for what debate ever is?),
might it make sense for animal rights supporters simply to concede that their most adamant counterparts
could in fact be correct? Animals, arguably, should be accorded no rights at all, at least when such rights
bump up against even the slightest of human interests.
If animal advocates did allow this concession, would they not be giving up their single most powerful argu-
ment { the very one, indeed, that has succeeded in forcing both regulatory agencies and research institutions
the world over, in the eld of cosmetics as well as medicine, to rethink their positions regarding the use of
animals in scientic experimentation? If this argument is taken away from the laboratory animals it has
partially protected, what possible method of persuasion could remain for them? The answer is a simple but
strong one: economics. There are three economic reasons that traditional in vivo animal testing should be
replaced by alternative methods: In vivo tests (1) are, in and of themselves, quite expensive; (2) require a
great deal of time to complete; and (3) often do not produce results that are valid as applied to humans.
This proposal, then, is one based not on the utilitarian model that Regan and other animal rights supporters
assert,113 but rather on economic utilitarianism focused on companies rather than animals.
The rst, most directly economic, point is documented not only by recommendations to governing bodies114
but also, somewhat surprisingly, by one of animal-testing's most vehement supporters. Cohen writes:
112See Kress, supra note 27, at 367.
113See, e.g., Regan, supra note 5, at 25-26.
114See, e.g., Report, supra note 19.
27For the investigator, the use of animals as subjects is often more expensive, in money
and time, than the use of human subjects. Access to suitable human subjects is
often quick and convenient, whereas access to appropriate animal subjects may be
awkward, costly, and burdened with rep tape. Physician-investigators have often
had more experience working with human beings and know precisely where the
needed pool of subjects is to be found and how they may be enlisted. Animals, and
the procedures for their use, are often less familiar to these investigators. Moreover,
the use of animals in place of humans is now more likely to be the target of zealous
protests from without.115
What, one might ask, is Carl Cohen doing making statements such as these? Although he intends them to
provide support for his somewhat convoluted argument about why animal testing should be increased, rather
than decreased,116 they in fact do more for the opposite proposition. Perhaps one problem with Cohen's
reasoning is that he sees only two options: experimentation on animals or experimentation on humans. The
development of alternative in vitro and computer-model methods of testing cosmetic products for safety is a
third option which, though it may be costly at its inception, would eventually be cheaper than both animal
and human testing and would eliminate the moral issues that both Cohen and his opponents raise.
The second point, also supported by Cohen's statement, is based on the clich e that \time is money," an
unavoidable reality in the manufacturing industry. In the production of new medications and drugs, post-
poning the date at which a product is available for sale causes the manufacturer to lose the money he might
have made had it been placed on the shelf earlier. This concept is simple and intuitive. However, it does
not fully encapsulate the monetary losses a manufacturer would experience as a direct result of a time delay.
Every day of the testing process means one day more of wages paid to laboratory employees, animal housing
and care costs, &c. The economic incentive { which Cohen is distressed to discover leads manufactures to
favor the quicker and less expensive method of human testing by physicians in the eld { favors seeking out
ways to avoid such costs. Once again, in vitro alternatives would do just that and would provide the safer
116Cohen continues: \The upshot is that humans are sometimes subjected to risks that animals could have borne, and should
have borne, in their place. To maximize the protection of human subjects, I conclude, the wide and imaginative use of live
animal subjects should be encouraged rather than discouraged. This enlargement in the use of animals is our obligation." Id.
28products Cohen wants to see made available to the human consumer.117
The nal point has been stated above: namely, that while the results of in vivo tests in animals often cor-
relate fairly closely with those of tests in human populations, there are many instances in which they do
not. While it may be true that many in vitro tests will take a great while to develop, and in the meantime
researchers will have to get by, in order to protect consumers, with wasteful and perhaps even misleading
data from in vivo test procedures, the day will come (as long as there is sucient money to fund such needed
progress) when alternative testing methods will be perfected and animals will be relieved of onerous and
unwilling duties in the scientic laboratory.118 The fundamental economic argument here is one of waste-
prevention:119 it is illogical to spend money on tests whose results are unreliable, especially if they lead a
company to market a product whose detriment to human { as opposed to animal { health results in a suit
for damages led by an injured person. It simply does not make economic sense to continue spending money
on illusory protection, unless of course such illusory protection is a regulatory prerequisite to allowing the
product to be sold to humans. And if this is true, animal rights advocates should focus at least part of their
eorts on convincing the regulators of the safety problems with the tests { and hopefully also of the benets,
in terms of both validity and cost, of alternative methods.
This paper does not argue, as the opening paragraphs of this section may seem to suggest, that animals
should be seen as devoid of rights. On the contrary, it is lled with strong arguments pointing the other way.
Its nal assertion, however, is that those seeking to secure protection for animals in cosmetic laboratories
117Alternatives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and Education, OTA-BA-273, supra note 84, at 7 (citing as one
advantage in a list of both problems with and benets gained from animal testing \savings in time, with the benet of obtaining
results more quickly.").
118See, e.g., id. at 12, 13 (claiming not only that while \[g]overnment regulatory practices can be read as promoting animal
testing, ...the laws and practices appear exible enough to accept alternatives when such tests become scientically acceptable"
but also that \research areas most likely to result in useful alternatives include computer simulation of living systems; cell,
tissue, and organ culture technology; animal care and health; and mechanisms of pain and pain perception.") Finally, for U.S.
Supreme Court support of this hopeful vision, see generally Justice Douglas's dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
751 (1972) (hoping that eventually \all of the forms of life ...will stand before the court { the pileated woodpecker as well
as the coyote and bear, the lemmings as well as the trout in the streams. Those inarticulate members of the ecological group
cannot speak. But ...people ...will be able to speak for the entire ecological community.").
119See Dillman, supra note 21.
29should not allow themselves to become entangled in the emotional side of this old and ongoing debate. To
do so invites an ultimately inconclusory, and perhaps violent, discourse. While animal advocates should
continue to uphold whatever emotion-based views they feel are correct, if they are interested in tangible
change they should follow the advice of the Commission of the European Communities's Annual Report
and not only encourage legislation that will force industry to eliminate in vivo testing through alternative
methods but also seek to demonstrate just how much money could be saved in the long run if, even absent
legislation compelling them to do so, cosmetics manufacturers would invest now120 in developing in vitro
and other alternative means of testing their products that require less time than traditional in vivo tests
and, most importantly, fewer dollars and cents.
120Bernard E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science 168 (1989), provides the
following observation, which both identies the chief motivating power in the American corporate environment and suggests a
way it can quite eectively be harnessed to further the interests of animal rights: \In a remarkable coup, [the outspoken animal
advocate Henry] Spira ...managed to extract from Revlon a `donation' of $750,000 to fund the study of alternatives to the
Draize eye-irritancy test in rabbits, pointing out quite reasonably that cosmetics manufacturers would be adversely aected by
a campaign which showed that they tortured rabbits to create their products."
30